Oncogene Linked to Growth Factor Receptorc.. .8 BOOK REVIEWS Alan Turing, reviewed by R. E. Rider; Rivers, C. R. Thorne ial Deterrence or Nuclear Suicide ihrase "nuclear winter" has already become a part of our language, completely new strategic implications of the nuclear winter scenari-,e not yet received any great public attention or discussion. The t of a nuclear winter has been greeted as just one more chapter (a ipter?) in the story of Armageddon that has been told to us so often iast 40 years. We believe the story, but it no longer moves us. So new about nuclear winter? is new is that the nuclear winter scenario replaces the prospect of destruction through the failure of mutual deterrence by the prospect red self-destruction through nuclear attack. If the analysis of the effects of a nuclear strike is correct, then no nation can make a uclear attack even against an unarmed opponent without committing -without itself receiving punishment as severe as that imposed on ided victim. Nuclear weapons, by their guarantee of suicide, become vn deterrent. Lausibility of the current doctrine, that mutual deterrence by arming reth is a preventive for nuclear war, has been steadily eroding. As load of each power increases, so do the demands of its opponent for ncy of its nuclear force, in order that ability to reply to an attack ensured. As warning times decrease to the vanishing point, not only prisal against the aggressor become less certain, but Strangelove ties become fascinated again with the possibilities of a "surgical" tive strike. And, of course, the opportunities for all kinds of ded triggerings of nuclear exchanges multiply. Mutual deterrence is ngly viewed as a bankrupt policy, which we cling to for lack of an ive. lear weapons are suicidal, guaranteed to cripple or destroy the user thout a response from the targeted victim, then the futility of mutual ice is complete. A second strike is no more appetizing than a first, reemptive strike loses any gambling appeal that it might have had. wers have supplied themselves with mountains of suicidal weapons ch there is now no discernible use, either for deterrence or aga these questions of human survival, we must not be precipitous. the scientific basis for the nuclear winter nor its strategic implicave been examined in the depth that they require. It is too early firm conclusions about what strategy should govern the deployment sumptively suicidal weapon. A plausible inference is that-such a is worse than none, either for attack or deterrence, and that the way )pen for nuclear disarmament, even unilateral partial disarmament. t conclusion may be simplistic. It would be rash to proceed on it a more thorough analysis of the nuclear winter than has yet been id a careful study of alternative strategies. :erms of the nuclear standoff have been changed-fundamentally 1. Awakened to that fact, we must proceed at once to an examination cientific reality of the nuclear winter and of the implications of this 
